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CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
Yuka Fukunaga*
INTRODUCTION

T

he legitimacy of a rule or an institution is important because it
may encourage voluntary compliance with the rule or the institution’s decisions, while the lack of legitimacy may be used as an excuse
for noncompliance.1 Legitimacy is especially critical within the context
of international law, as the international community lacks effective enforcement tools.2 This Article focuses on the legitimacy of the World
Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) dispute settlement system.3 As the coverage of the WTO Agreement4 expands and its enforcement intensifies,
its impact on the lives of citizens becomes more extensive and profound.
The dispute settlement system has been criticized for enforcing the WTO
Agreement without due regard to the nontrade interests and values of
civil society.5 Given that citizens have become important stakeholders in
international trade disputes, critics demand that the dispute settlement
system reflect the concerns of not only States and businesses, but also
civil society.

* Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, Waseda University. This research
is partly funded by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research of the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (Japan). I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Junji Nakagawa and Professor Akira Kotera, who gave me valuable
insights and comments.
1. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
212–16 (Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978).
2. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 27–40 (1990).
3. The WTO was established in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round, the last
round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. WORLD
TRADE ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 3 (2007), http://www.wto.org/e
nglish/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. The WTO has 153 member nations, and this accounts
for approximately 97% of world trade. Id. at 7. The WTO’s dispute settlement system,
the WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels, is instrumental in enforcing WTO
rules and “ensuring that trade flows smoothly.” Id. at 5. Nearly 400 disputes have been
brought before the dispute settlement system, and almost 300 rulings (including panel
and Appellate Body reports and arbitration awards) have been issued. WTO Dispute Settlement: Basic Facts and Figures, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/basicfigures.asp.
(last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO Agreement includes the Marrakesh Agreement and the other agreements in its annexes.
5. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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There are many existing proposals on how to legitimize the dispute
settlement system in civil society. Some proposals introduce innovative
concepts such as “constitutionalism,” 6 “democracy,” 7 and “governance,”8 while others focus on specific revisions to the dispute settlement system, such as the acceptance of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs
and the incorporation of nontrade values.9 Despite the divergence of
views, most of the proposals maintain that the dispute settlement system
should directly reflect the diverse interests and values of citizens so as to
be perceived legitimate by civil society.
While the primary question scholars have asked is how this can be accomplished, in the author’s view, there are more fundamental questions
to be addressed. In the first place, why does the dispute settlement system, an intergovernmental trade tribunal, need to respond to civil society’s demand for legitimacy? Does enhanced legitimacy as perceived by
civil society also improve the overall legitimacy of the system? Furthermore, even if such legitimacy needs to be taken into account, is the dispute settlement system suitable for and capable of directly representing
and coordinating the various concerns of civil society?
Responding to these questions, this Article is organized as follows:
Part I analyzes several key sources of legitimacy in the dispute settlement system and demonstrates that there is a conflicting relationship
6. See, e.g., DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM (2005); CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND
SOCIAL REGULATION (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006); THE EU
AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2001).
7. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451
(2001); Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000); Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension,
37 J. WORLD TRADE 105 (2003). Without defining the terms, this Article discusses the
substance of constitutionalism and democracy to the extent that these concepts are relevant. It should be noted that these terms have been developed in the domestic sphere and
that there is always a risk of incorporating such terms into the international sphere. J.H.H.
WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?”
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 270 (1999).
8. See, e.g., TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL
BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION (2004); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (1996); Daniel C. Esty,
Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123 (1998) [hereinafter Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations].
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among the various sources of legitimacy. Part II examines civil society’s
demand for legitimacy and discusses various proposals that seek to set
forth how this demand can be fulfilled in the dispute settlement system.
While recognizing the growing significance of civil society in the context
of international trade, this section criticizes these proposals and shows
how they might impair the overall legitimacy of the system. Part III discusses alternative ways of legitimizing the dispute settlement system as
perceived by civil society. Underscoring that the dispute settlement system is merely part of the plural international and domestic legal orders,
this section argues that the interests and values of civil society should be
considered and reflected in different domains, both WTO and non-WTO,
and at international, regional, national, and local levels.
I. SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
In defining legitimacy, it is helpful to distinguish between two different types of legitimacy—objective and subjective.10 Objective legitimacy follows from the actual properties of a rule or institution.11 For example, an international treaty is objectively legitimate when its text clearly
articulates what the contracting States have agreed to. Likewise, an international institution is objectively legitimate when its structure effectively helps to achieve its goals. Subjective legitimacy arises from the
perceptions of a rule or institution by those affected by the rule or institution.12 In particular, the perceptions by States, expressed by their consent
(or the lack thereof) to a rule or institution, determine the subjective legitimacy of the rule or institution.13 Although objective and subjective legitimacy spring from different sources, these two types of legitimacy
may affect one another. For example, if a rule or institution is ineffective,
a State may refuse to consent to the rule or institution.
What confers legitimacy, either in an objective or subjective sense, varies across areas of international law and over the course of time.14 State
10. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 385, 424–25 (2003).
11. See FRANCK, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing legitimacy as a property of an institution’s rules or rulemaking process that pulls actors towards compliance).
12. See FRANCK, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that an actor’s perception of a rule’s or
institution’s legitimacy will dictate the extent to which the actor complies).
13. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 558–59 (1993).
14. For example, scientific expertise is an essential source of legitimacy in making
and enforcing regulations on whaling. David Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of
Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 154, 159–63 (1995). However, the
legitimacy argument once demanded the universal participation of the interested States
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consent is a primary, though implicit, source of legitimacy in international law. Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, when States consent to an international rule, they accept its legitimacy and agree to
comply with it.15 As state consent was traditionally viewed as the exclusive source of legitimacy in international law, legitimacy was not explicitly discussed as distinct from state consent until recently.16 Despite the
continuing importance of state consent, there is a growing belief in the
international community that state consent is insufficient to persuade
States of the legitimacy of an international rule or institution.17 There are
several explanations for this new trend.18
First, the structure of international law is changing to include not only
the law of coexistence, but also the law of cooperation.19 Consequently,
an international law rule or institution must address new situations in a
manner that differs from the texts of the treaties and agreements to which
States have consented. Something in addition to state consent is necessary to legitimize the subsequent evolution of an international law rule or
in the Antarctic Treaty System. Richard Falk, The Antarctic Treaty System: Are There
Viable Alternatives?, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 399, 412
(Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991). In the context of the European
community, one scholar has suggested that in the process of European integration, the
sources of legitimacy have been expanded to include not only a democratic foundation,
but also a “broad, empirically determined societal acceptance.” J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2468–74 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler,
Transformation].
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining pacta sunt servanda as the principle that
binds parties to an agreement and ensures performance of its terms in good faith). See
also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 604 (1999) (discussing consent).
16. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 412–13 (2006) (discussing state consent
as a measure of legitimacy and referring to this standard as the “International Legal Pedigree View” of legitimacy); id. at 417–18 (noting characteristics of legitimacy that must
be assessed independent of democratic state consent). See also IAN HURD, AFTER
ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 5–7
(2007) (stating that consent does not fully explain state behavior).
17. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 15, at 606–11, 623–24; Joshua Meltzer, State
Sovereignty and Legitimacy of the WTO, 9336 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 693, 693–94
(2005); Weiler, Transformation, supra note 14, at 2468–69.
18. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 912–15 (2004) (arguing that the development of international law as governance blurs the distinction between national and
international law and consequently leads to the issue of democratic legitimacy).
19. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
60–71 (1964).
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institution. Second, the coverage of international law has expanded to
include nonstate actors. A State may be prevented from complying with
an international law rule if its people do not consider the rule legitimate.20 Thus, legitimacy needs to be ensured from the perspective of
nonstate actors within the State.21 Finally, international tribunals have
begun to play a more important role in interpreting international law
rules, a role that in the past was fulfilled by States alone.22 These tribunals may be remote from the control of state consent, and this raises concerns about the legitimacy of their interpretations as well as the tribunals
themselves.
Having recognized the significance of legitimacy in international law,
it remains to be examined what, in addition to state consent, confers legitimacy to international law. The composition of additional sources of
legitimacy and the significance of each may even vary within a single
institution.23 The following subsections examine major sources of objective and subjective legitimacy in the dispute settlement system.24 The
chief purpose of this Section is not to create an exhaustive list of legiti-

20. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collective Project,
1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 142 (1995).
21. Bodansky, supra note 15, at 610–11.
22. Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities,
12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371, 372, 385 (1991).
23. Such variety exists within the WTO as well. In trade liberalization negotiations,
the involvement of every Member State is strongly preferred in order to ensure the legitimacy of the negotiations. For example, developing countries are encouraged to participate in the current services negotiations through the submission of any kind of liberalization requests and offers. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines
and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services, ¶¶ 1–2, S/L/93 (Mar. 29,
2001). What matters here is not the substance of liberalization commitments, but rather
the fact that all the members are involved in the liberalization process. Id. On the other
hand, in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (“TPRM”), the completeness and accuracy
of information is more critical than the attendance and remarks of every member at
TPRM meetings. Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules
Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and
Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153, 158–63 (2007). The most
remarkable example of such variety can be illustrated by the difference between the decision-making procedure in the negotiations and that in the dispute settlement system. The
former adopts the consensus approach, whereas the latter adopts the negative consensus
approach, and not without reason. See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
57, 101 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO].
24. Bodansky, supra note 15, at 601–02.
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macy sources,25 but rather to reveal the relative value of each.26 This
analysis will show that the overall legitimacy of the dispute settlement
system is achieved through a delicate balance among its various legitimacy sources.
A. Objective Legitimacy
There are four indispensable factors that confer objective legitimacy to
the dispute settlement system: independence, transparency, authority, and
effectiveness.27 Regarding the first,28 impartial rulings made by independent tribunal members help ensure that no political or special interest
groups prejudice rulings in favor of one party. Transparency, also an essential source of objective legitimacy in the dispute settlement system,
fosters its impartiality by enabling the public to monitor the adjudication
of disputes.29 The third source is the authority of the system.30 Unless

25. Scholars have attempted to draw a list of legitimacy sources in and outside the
context of the WTO. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational
Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1515–22 (2006) [hereinafter
Esty, Good Governance]; Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory
of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 298–337 (1997); Robert
Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law:
The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA:
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35, 41–68 (J.H.H. Weiler ed.,
2000); Kumm, supra note 18, at 917–27.
26. A factor that enhances objective legitimacy could undermine subjective legitimacy and vice versa. Moreover, the sources of legitimacy of the dispute settlement system
do not necessarily ensure the legitimacy of other branches of the WTO, or the WTO as a
whole. BROUDE, supra note 8, at 57–73; Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World
Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 50–56 (2005) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, Transformation]. But
see Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 458–65 (1996).
27. These sources of objective legitimacy are merely illustrative. There can be other
sources of objective legitimacy in the dispute settlement system, although this Article
does not discuss them.
28. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 276–84 (2003). But
see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 29–54 (2005) (statistically analyzing the practices of international tribunals, including the WTO, and rejecting the correlation between the independence and
the effectiveness of the tribunals).
29. Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 109, 109–11 (1998); Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M.
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 248 (2003).
30. Bodansky, supra note 15, at 605–06 (discussing authority in terms of legality and
legitimacy). In this Article, “authority” signifies the legal validity of the jurisdictional
basis and findings of the panels and the Appellate Body.
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panel and Appellate Body reports are based on a valid jurisdictional basis
and legally sound findings, the reports will lack the power to induce the
responding party to comply. Finally, the dispute settlement system cannot be objectively legitimate unless it is effective in achieving its institutional goals, the most primary of which is the resolution of disputes.31
These sources of objective legitimacy may conflict with one another,
and each source contributes to the overall legitimacy of the system to a
different degree. Placing greater emphasis on one legitimacy source
could conflict with another source and thus lower the overall legitimacy
of the system. Thus, we need to be aware of the different importance of
each source when we emphasize or de-emphasize one source over others.
A fine balance among these sources of legitimacy bestows overall objective legitimacy to the dispute settlement system.
This can be illustrated by the relationship between independence and
transparency. The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”) sets forth detailed provisions regarding the independence of the tribunals’ composition and deliberations.32 The DSU thereby ensures that the proceedings of the dispute
settlement system are free from any undue influence of interested parties33 or WTO political divisions, such as the Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”).34 However, the dispute settlement system has often been criti31. Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing
Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 277–78 (2008) (discussing deliberation as a means to achieve legitimacy). There is an interdependent relationship between the effectiveness of a rule or institution and the legitimacy of a rule or institution.
While the effective resolution of disputes is a fundamental source of legitimacy in the
dispute settlement system, the legitimacy of the system helps ensure effective dispute
resolution. Caron, supra note 13, at 558–61 (“[P]erceptions of illegitimacy may work
against the effectiveness of the Security Council.”).
32. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
arts. 8.2, 8.9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]. See also WTO Dispute Settlement, Working Procedures for
Appellate Review, art. 6.2, WT/AB/WP/5 (Jan. 4, 2005).
33. There is an exception wherein the parties are allowed to oppose the composition
of panelists proposed by the WTO Secretariat if they have “compelling reasons” to do so.
DSU, supra note 32, art. 8.6. In this manner, the parties can exert some influence over the
selection of panelists. This frequently invoked exception is justified in order to make the
selection legitimate from the perspective of the parties.
34. The DSB, comprised of all WTO member governments, is authorized to decide to
establish a panel and adopt a panel report. DSU, supra note 32, art. 6.1 (regarding the
establishment of panels); id. art. 16 (regarding the adoption of reports). Under the negative consensus approach, such decisions are made automatically and the authority of the
DSB is nominal. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 23, at 56. The influence of
member governments would grow if their authority was made effective. Special Session
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cized for its serious lack of transparency. The DSU states that the deliberations of the tribunals shall be kept confidential35 and that unless a
party to a dispute decides to disclose its submissions to the public, written submissions to the tribunals shall remain confidential.36 While critics
have suggested that the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system
should be improved by enhancing its transparency,37 this suggestion
overlooks how transparency and independence may conflict with each
other.
In some cases, the system’s transparency may enhance its independence. For example, the publication of party submissions may prevent
the tribunals from considering exogenous factors, such as political factors, that are not included in the submissions. Nevertheless, the transparency of the dispute settlement system may clash with its independence.38
For example, transparency might open the way for various actors to influence dispute settlement proceedings.39 Public attendance and media
coverage of tribunal meetings might sway panelists and Appellate Body
members in favor of one of the parties and could thereby impair their
independence. In addition, the requirement to publicize all party submissions might encourage the disputing parties to settle a dispute outside the
dispute settlement system. Thus, there is a conflicting relationship between the transparency and independence of the dispute settlement system, and these two sources must be balanced to achieve greater objective
legitimacy.
A similar relationship exists between the system’s authority and effectiveness. The jurisdictional basis of a panel to adjudicate disputes is esof the Dispute Settlement Body, Revised Textual Proposal by Chile and the United
States: Flexibility and Member Control, TN/DS/W/89 (May 31, 2007) (proposing the
so-called “partial adoption” procedure).
35. DSU, supra note 32, arts. 14, 17.10.
36. Id. art. 18.2.
37. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 365–68 (2006) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Nongovernmental
Organizations]; Esty, Good Governance, supra note 25, at 1544–47.
38. The position of the DSU is that the independence of the dispute settlement system
should be prioritized over the transparency of the system. DSU, supra note 32, arts. 8.2,
14, 17 (Article 8.2 explicitly calls for the selection of independent panel members, while
Articles 14 and 17 require the confidentiality of both the panel and the Appellate Body
proceedings, thereby subverting transparency.). The dispute settlement system is relatively open, at least for members, in that a member can easily intervene in dispute settlement proceedings either as a co-complaining party or as a third party. Yuji Iwasawa,
WTO Dispute Settlement as Judicial Supervision, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 287, 300–03 (2002)
(pointing out the liberal approach of WTO panels in permitting intervention by nonparty
WTO members).
39. Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 29, at 228.
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tablished at a DSB meeting upon a request filed by the complaining party
and the scope of the panel’s jurisdiction is limited to the specific facts
and WTO provisions explicitly mentioned in the request.40 On the one
hand, this restraint on the panel’s authority may be justified because it
enables the panel and the parties to focus on specifically defined issues,
and to develop and refine factual and legal arguments. On the other hand,
limited jurisdiction may prevent the panel from considering changes in
circumstances subsequent to a panel request,41 or the broader context of
a dispute.42 As a result, a panel may fail to provide an effective solution
to the overall dispute between the parties. In practice, when defining its
jurisdictional scope, a panel must attain a balance between the need to
restrain its authority and the need to resolve a dispute effectively.
B. Subjective Legitimacy
Subjective legitimacy arises from the views of stakeholders in trade
disputes.43 Most importantly, it refers to legitimacy as perceived by
governments, particularly those of disputing parties. 44 The WTO
Agreement expressly provides for the rights and obligations of governments, and it is the governments of the disputing parties that owe obligations resulting from the settlement of disputes.45 Thus, a government
may refuse to comply with a dispute settlement decision if it considers
the decision or the dispute settlement system itself to be illegitimate.46
40. DSU, supra note 32, arts. 6–7.
41. According to the Appellate Body, factual developments subsequent to the panel
establishment can fall within the panel’s jurisdiction provided the developments did not
change the essence of the original measure identified in the panel request. Appellate
Body Report, Chile—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products, ¶¶ 135–44, WT/DS207/AB/R (Sept. 23, 2002). See also Panel
Report, India—Measure Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶¶ 7.23–.37, 8.14–.30,
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec 21, 2001).
42. In a recent WTO dispute, the Appellate Body refused to adjudicate non-WTO
issues even though the issues before the Appellate Body were only a part of the broader
dispute between the parties. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft
Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 78, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico—Soft Drinks].
43. As actors in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, the views of the stakeholders
will determine the degree of legitimacy conferred on the institution. See HURD, supra note
16, at 7 (discussing the subjective facet of legitimacy, generally, as “an actor’s normative
belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”).
44. See id. (examining how an actor’s “perception” of an institution and its rules will
affect behavior).
45. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 32, arts. 3.2, 19.1.
46. DSU, supra note 32, art. 19.1. But cf. Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and
the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the DSU, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 352

94

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:1

The subjective legitimacy of the system also depends upon the perceptions of businesses.47 Although they do not have immediate legal obligations under the dispute settlement system, businesses are deeply affected
by the economic effects of trade disputes. However, unlike the subjective
legitimacy on the part of governments, legitimacy as perceived by businesses is not directly reflected in the structure of the dispute settlement
system. For example, businesses are not allowed to bring a case directly
to the dispute settlement system. 48 If they wish to file a complaint
against a WTO member, they need to persuade their government to do
so.49 In addition, businesses cannot attend panel and Appellate Body
meetings, even if their vital interests are involved in a dispute.50 While
the intergovernmental nature of the WTO may explain the exclusion of
businesses from dispute settlement proceedings, 51 it may appear to
businesses that the statist approach deprives them of the right to advance
their economic interests directly before the WTO.52 Nevertheless, busi(2004) (analyzing the DSU’s inability to enforce its decisions by means other than “allowing the complaining party to erect retaliatory trade barriers against the offending party
until the offending party complies with the ruling”).
47. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 877–86 (1995) (arguing that in
an “Efficient Market Model” of international trade dispute resolution, “governments and
businesses that favor free trade may circumvent domestic protectionist groups and increase the world’s wealth” through international trade laws and tribunals). See also Panel
Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.71–.94,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (stating that the objects and purposes of Article 23 of the
DSU are “the creation of market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in
national and global markets and . . . the provision of a secure and predictable multilateral
trading system”).
48. GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN
WTO LITIGATION 15 (2003).
49. See id. at 31–50 (describing the “public-private collaboration” that allows the
interests of private firms a point of entry into the DSB).
50. DSU, supra note 32, app. 3 (“The panel shall meet in closed session. The parties
to the dispute, and interested parties, shall be present at the meetings only when invited
by the panel to appear before it.”).
51. In international investment arbitrations, private businesses can directly sue the
government of a host country in accordance with the rules of international law. See, e.g.,
Wong-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Paradigm, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 735–36 (2007) (discussing the advantages of international
investment arbitration). While direct standing is beneficial to investing businesses, arbitrators and their decisions are occasionally criticized for disregarding the legitimate public policy concerns of the host country. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1521–23, 1584–88 (2005).
52. Shell, supra note 47, at 902–03. But see Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing
in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L
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nesses often have a close connection with their government, which
enables them to exert influence over trade policy.53 In fact, governments
participating in dispute settlement proceedings often act as faithful
agents of businesses, and a government’s decision to file a complaint
with the dispute settlement system is often a response to the demands of
businesses.54 Thus, the lack of legitimacy as perceived by businesses is
supplemented by their partnership with governments in the domestic
sphere.55
While in some cases subjective legitimacy is derived from objective
legitimacy, in others, these two types of legitimacy may be incompatible.
This relationship may be illustrated by the former decision-making procedures in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), the
consensus approach.56 Under the consensus approach, a panel could not
be established and a panel report could not be adopted unless all the contracting parties to the GATT reached a consensus to that effect.57
This approach had both positive and negative effects on the overall legitimacy of the GATT dispute settlement system. On the one hand, the
consensus approach weakened the dispute settlement system’s indepenECON. L. 669, 699 (2004) [hereinafter Nichols, Standing] (presenting a skeptical view on
the direct standing of nongovernmental actors).
53. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1
J. INT’L ECON. L. 433, 441–51 (1998) (describing the significant roles played by private
companies behind the film dispute between Japan and the United States). See also William H. Barringer & James P. Durling, Out of Focus: The Use of Section 301 to Address
Anticompetitive Practices in Foreign Markets, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 98
(1996). Of course, there are also cases where a government refused a request by businesses to bring a case to the dispute settlement system in the light of public policy considerations. See Petros C. Mavroidis et. al., Is the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Responsive to the Needs of the Traders? Would a System of Direct Action by Private
Parties Yield Better Results?, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 151 (1998).
54. One of the typical examples is Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, a WTO dispute between Japan and the United States, which was
triggered by the struggle between the private film companies Fuji and Kodak. Barringer
& Durling, supra note 53.
55. See generally SHAFFER, supra note 48 (evaluating how private companies collaborate with governmental authorities in the domestic sphere to challenge foreign trade
barriers before the WTO).
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. [hereinafter GATT Agreement]. The GATT is the predecessor to
the WTO and is now incorporated in the WTO Agreement as the GATT 1994. WTO
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2(4). The decision-making procedures in the GATT, including those in the dispute settlement system, have adopted the consensus approach.
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 165, 231–33 (1993).
57. Id. at 231–33.
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dence and effectiveness, sources of objective legitimacy. It gave de facto
veto power to every contracting party, and this occasionally interrupted
the flow of the dispute settlement proceedings.58 On the other hand, the
government parties perceived the dispute settlement system’s proceedings and decisions to be legitimate because the unanimous consent of
contracting parties was required.59 At the time the GATT was adopted, it
was not backed by strong political support.60 Thus, although the consensus approach interfered with the GATT’s objective legitimacy, this
approach was favored because it increased the GATT’s legitimacy as
perceived by the governments of the contracting parties.61
However, as trade relations expanded and trade disputes increased, the
contracting parties gradually became frustrated by the ineffectiveness of
the GATT dispute settlement system, which eventually led the United
States to pursue unilateralism.62 The U.S. response persuaded the contracting parties to tackle the system’s inefficiency. Consequently, the
Uruguay Round adopted the negative consensus approach, which allows
for the automatic establishment of a panel and the automatic adoption of
a panel report.63
While the negative consensus approach improved the effectiveness of
the dispute settlement system by giving it de facto compulsory jurisdic-

58. For example, in the GATT disputes between the United States and the European
Community in the 1980s, the adoption of panel reports was either blocked or significantly
delayed by the refusal of one or some of the contracting parties. Id. at 145–64.
59. But see Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355, 359–63 (Jean-Marc Coicaud &
Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001) (pointing out that the legitimating value of state consent is
“inherently limited or insufficient”).
60. After World War II, there was a major need for international economic institutions, and although the GATT was originally intended to serve as a multilateral treaty,
and not an organization, the GATT began to apply provisionally in the deadlock of the
negotiation of the International Trade Organization. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35–41
(1989).
61. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 8.
62. Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA’S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 113, 125–36 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
63. Under the negative consensus approach, the DSB establishes a panel and adopts a
panel report automatically unless it decides otherwise by consensus. HUDEC, supra note
56, at 237 (stating that “the only plausible explanation” for the inclusion of the negative
consensus approach is the U.S. unilateral legal policy). See also Pauwelyn, Transformation, supra note 26, at 29–32 (“[S]urrender of the veto occurred through [an] . . . incremental process, closing off a major exit route, while injecting new levels of voice” in the
political decision-making process.).
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tion,64 it also reduced governments’ control over proceedings, thereby
threatening to impair the subjective legitimacy of the system. Thus,
complementary measures were introduced to compensate for the diminished role of state consent. For example, in order to enhance the overall
legitimacy of the system, the Uruguay Round adopted improvements
such as the creation of the Appellate Body, the unification of dispute settlement procedures, and the clarification of the standard of review.65 In
short, the former decision-making procedure in the GATT demonstrates
how the structure of the dispute settlement system strikes a balance between objective and subjective legitimacy.
II. LEGITIMACY AS PERCEIVED BY CIVIL SOCIETY
A. Background and Criticism
Recently, the dispute settlement system has been criticized for disregarding the nontrade interests and values of citizens, such as the environment, human rights, and health.66 This criticism adds a new dimension to establishing the overall legitimacy of the system.67 In the past,
citizens were relatively indifferent to international trade rules because
these rules tended to be very technical and appeared to have no visible
impact on them.68 Accordingly, the GATT dispute settlement system
was created without considering civil society’s concerns.69 Citizens attributed little significance to the system, which seemed most relevant for
governments and large businesses. However, the situation is now chang-

64. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?: Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.
25, 33–35 (1998).
65. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
177–98 (1997).
66. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 25, at 62–68; Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The
WTO Impact on Internal Regulations—A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute,
in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 283, 300–06 (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (pointing out that the Appellate Body did consider
nontrade values in interpreting Article III of GATT 1994); Philip M. Nichols, Trade
Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 6, 709–18 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Values].
67. Howse, supra note 25, at 36–42 (arguing that tribunals must address nontrade
values fairly and sensitively because dispute settlement outcomes must now have “social
legitimacy” in addition to “formal legitimacy”).
68. John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 557–58 (2000).
69. Shoaib A. Ghias, International Judicial Lawmaking: A Theoretical and Political
Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 534, 546–47 (2006).

98

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:1

ing.70 Civil society is becoming increasingly conscious of and concerned
about international trade rules and dispute settlements.
One of the major reasons for this change is the development of international trade rules. Since the GATT, the WTO rules have expanded substantially and now cover every aspect of the trade in goods, services, intellectual property rights, and investments.71 The WTO Agreement may
even occasionally have a detrimental affect on nontrade-related domestic
regulation, such as the regulation of food safety and environmental protection.72 Moreover, improved enforcement through the WTO’s dispute
settlement system reinforces the impact of the WTO Agreement’s expansive rules.73
Concurrent with the development of international trade rules, the flow
of international trade and investments has been increasing at an unprecedented rate,74 thereby furthering not only economic, but also social and
cultural globalization. As a result, even citizens who were unconcerned
with trade rules have been forced to face the challenges of globalization.
Recognizing that they are critical stakeholders in international trade disputes, citizens are demanding a say in the dispute settlement system,
which they have criticized as statist and trade-biased.75
In part, the position of citizens in international trade disputes is similar
to that of businesses, as citizens’ interests and values are also not directly
70. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 269–72 (2001) (arguing
that the club arrangements of trade politics—under which small numbers of rich-country
trade ministers controlled the agenda and made deals—are being undercut by their success).
71. WTO Agreement, supra note 4.
72. Nichols, Values, supra note 66, at 672–90 (pointing out that societal values, such
as the environment, labor, and cultural identity, may conflict with the precepts of free
trade).
73. See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten
Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17 (2005) (discussing the success of the dispute settlement
system).
74. For example, the global inflow of foreign direct investment in 2006 was $1306
billion, compared to $202 billion in 1990. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT at 9, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007).
75. Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 173, 197–212 (2000). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and
International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 753, 789–90 (stating that the dispute settlement system should protect individual rights and that it should be open to nonstate actors). There
is also a controversy over the participation of civil society in rulemaking procedures. See,
e.g., Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 37, at 366–68.
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represented. However, unlike businesses, citizens are unorganized and
tend to lack close connections with their governments, making it difficult
for them to influence their policies.76 Moreover, foreign policy, an area
known for its high politics, is normally subject to only limited democratic control,77 which has been further eroded as the forces of globalization
shift decision-making fora from the domestic to the international
sphere.78 What supplements the lack of legitimacy as perceived by businesses (i.e., close connections with governments) is insufficiently available to citizens. The lack of subjective legitimacy on the part of citizens is
exacerbated by the absence or weakness of domestic channels, which
would allow them to better realize their preferences.79
Therefore, critics argue that the dispute settlement system should directly consider and reflect the diverse concerns of civil society without
relying on the intermediation of national governments.80 They have offered several specific ways in which this can be achieved. First, critics
have suggested opening panel and Appellate Body meetings to the public.81 Second, some have proposed the acceptance and consideration of
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by the public.82 Finally, oth76. See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight,
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 489–91 (2001) (noting that as the integration of international
institutions intensifies, national democracies tend to be more constrained).
77. The treaty-making power of the executive is normally subject to parliamentary
consent alone. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
49–68 (1990). See also Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 356, 357 (Robert O.
Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1972).
78. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–10 (2006) (discussing the exogenous and endogenous forces of
globalization); Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGE 19, 34 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds.,
1999) (pointing out that the costs of democracy should be taken into account when constructing international organizations). See also DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE
GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995).
79. See Eric Stein, supra note 76, at 489–91.
80. In a similar vein, some argue that international institutions should be accountable
to civil society. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World
Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1135–38 (2003) (discussing the
accountability of the U.N. Security Council). See also Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247 (2006) (examining to whom international institutions should be accountable).
81. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 177, 191 (2002).
82. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 9, at 348–57; Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations, supra note 9, 125–26.
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ers have maintained that trade tribunals should reflect nontrade concerns
in their interpretations of international trade rules.83
Given the growing impact of trade rules and trade disputes on civil society, the interests and values of citizens cannot be neglected in the settlement of international trade disputes. Unless citizens perceive the dispute settlement system and its rulings as legitimate, governments of responding parties will meet strong resistance from their citizens when implementing the dispute settlement rulings and may fail to internalize
these rulings into their domestic legal orders. Nevertheless, the critics’
proposals may disturb the balance among sources of legitimacy.
B. Effects of the Critics’ Proposals on Legitimacy
1. Open Panel and Appellate Body Meetings
Critics assert that opening panel and Appellate Body meetings to the
public will enhance the transparency of the dispute settlement system and
thereby improve its legitimacy as perceived by civil society.84 However,
this proposal may also have harmful effects on the system’s overall legitimacy. For example, the presence of citizens at meetings could prevent
governments of the disputing parties from reaching an effective solution
to the dispute.85 Open meetings could also impair the independence of
panel and Appellate Body reviews86 and interfere with governments’
control over proceedings. Special precautions would need to be taken in
order to avoid such results. A few recent cases illustrate the type of precautions that may be used. In US—Continued Suspension and Canada
—Continued Suspension, the disputing parties agreed to open the panel
83. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 25, at 62–68; Howse & Tuerk, supra note 66,
300–06 (pointing out that the Appellate Body did consider nontrade values in interpreting
Article III of GATT 1994); Nichols, Values, supra note 66, at 709–18. There is also a
proposal to take legislative measures, instead of adjudicative measures, in order to incorporate the nontrade concerns of citizens into the WTO. Guzman, supra note 8, at 309–28.
84. Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Further Contribution of the United
States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Relating
to the Transparency—Revised Legal Drafting, ¶¶ 1–2, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/86 (Apr. 21,
2006).
85. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that a solution mutually acceptable to the parties
is clearly preferred. DSU, supra note 32, art. 3.7. In practice, the parties to a dispute occasionally continue talks in order to reach an amicable solution to the dispute even after a
panel review has begun. E.g., Panel Report, Japan—Import Quotas on Dried Laver and
Seasoned Laver, ¶¶ 14–17, WT/DS323/R (Feb. 1, 2006) (noting that the parties reached a
mutually agreed solution after establishment of the panel).
86. As discussed above, the DSU prioritizes independence over the transparency of
the system. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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meetings to the public. 87 Citizens observed the meetings through
closed-circuit television broadcasts, but they were not allowed to sit in
the meeting rooms.88 This method was subsequently adopted in other
meetings because of its practical value in furthering transparency without
impairing the independence of the proceedings.89
2. The Acceptance and Consideration of Amicus Curiae Briefs
Another proposal offers that unsolicited amicus curiae briefs should be
accepted and considered in order to facilitate citizens’ participation in the
dispute settlement system. This proposal, though, may impair rather than
improve legitimacy as perceived by civil society. First, amicus curiae
briefs may not be sufficiently representative of civil society as a whole.90
Only a handful of citizens have the resources or expertise to submit them,
and there is no assurance that these citizens represent the collective
views of civil society.91
87. Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, United States—Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, Canada—Continued Suspension
of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/8, WT/DS321/8 (Aug. 2, 2005).
In these cases, the Appellate Body’s oral hearing was also opened to the public. WTO
Trade Topics Section: Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
public_hearing_july08_e.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
88. E.g., Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Meeting on “Zeroing” Dispute
Opened to the Public (Oct. 10, 2008). Among the citizens that came to these meetings
were journalists, nongovernmental organization representatives, and scholars. WTO 2005
News Items, Dispute Settlement—WTO Opens Panel Proceeding to Public for the First
Time, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/openpanel_12sep_e.htm.
89. After US—Continued Suspension and Canada—Continued Suspension, for cases
in which panel meetings were opened to the public at the request of the parties, see Panel
Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶
1.9, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008); Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the
Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSB by
the United States, ¶ 1.11, WT/DS27/RW/USA (May 19, 2008); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO: 2008 News Items—WTO Meeting on “Zeroing” Dispute Opened
to the Public, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/dispu322_10oct
08_e.htm (a decision for the dispute United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews has yet to be published); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO: 2008
News Items—WTO Hearings on Apple Dispute Opened to the Public, Aug. 11, 2008 (a
decision for the dispute Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from
New Zealand has yet to be published).
90. Yuka Fukunaga, Participation of Private Parties in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Processes: Treatment of Unsolicited Amicus Curiae Submissions, 4 SOOCHOW L.J. 99,
122–24 (2007) [hereinafter Fukunaga, Participation].
91. Although it is uncertain whether the proposed criteria can successfully sort out the
eligible amici curiae, some criteria are proposed to assess if amici curiae are suitably
representative. See, e.g., Hervé Ascensio, L’Amicus curiae devant les juridic-
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In addition, it would be difficult for panelists and Appellate Body
members to reconcile conflicting interests and values in amicus curiae
briefs.92 Critics seem to assume that these briefs would enable all trade
stakeholders to engage in a deliberative dialogue and to reach a rational
and persuasive outcome for the entire society.93 However, such a deliberative dialogue can only succeed in a polity in which citizens share a
common identity and common interests.94 At this point, the most common form of polity is the nation-state.95 A polity that transcends national
boundaries has not emerged and is not likely to do so in the near future.96
tions-internationales [Amicus Curiae Before International Courts], 105 REVUE GÉNÉRALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.I.D.P.] 897, 911–21 (2001) (Fr.); Erik B. Bluemel,
Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance, 31 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 139, 178–206 (2005); Gabrielle Marceau & Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 155,
179–81 (2001).
92. Fukunaga, Participation, supra note 90, at 125–28.
93. Esty, Good Governance, supra note 25, at 1520–21 (“In the international policy
arena, a transparent decision-making process that provides opportunities for debate and
political dialogue, with participation by those representing a broad range of views, is a
key to legitimacy, substituting for the missing democratic legitimacy and accountability
that elections provide.”); Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again:
The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 114–16 (2002)
(“[P]roviding participatory opportunities for NGOs is not simply a matter of addressing
the problem of agency costs of representative democracy—it is also a question of seizing
on the potential for deliberative democracy at the transnational level.”) (emphasis removed). For a discussion of deliberative democracy in general, see, for example, JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 107–09, 118 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
94. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6–7 (1991); Will Kymlicka & Christine Straehle, Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature,
7 EUR. J. PHIL. 65, 68–72, 82–83 (1999). Anderson describes this type of polity as follows:
[The nation] is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. . . . [I]t is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is
this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many
millions, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.
ANDERSON, supra, at 6–7.
95. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 8–18 (1991) (discussing the elements of
national identity).
96. See, e.g., id. at 175 (“[T]he chances of transcending the nation and superseding
nationalism are at present slim. . . . A growing cosmopolitanism does not in itself entail
the decline of nationalism.”); Bodansky, supra note 15, at 615–17 (“[A] demos—a shared
sense of community . . . is absent at the global level.”). See also Weiler, supra note 14, at
2466–74 (stating that even in the European Union, a collective polity has not emerged). It
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A deliberative dialogue might therefore be regarded as the unilateral imposition of a foreign value by foreign citizens.97 Given these circumstances, even if panels and the Appellate Body make rulings with full
awareness of all the interests and values represented by amicus curiae
briefs, the citizens adversely affected by the rulings may only consider
their concerns to have been illegitimately discounted in favor of others.
Second, the acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae briefs may
also harm the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy as perceived by
governments. Trade disputes often involve a direct conflict of economic
interests between disputing parties, and arguments of amicus curiae
briefs tend to favor the interests of one party to the detriment of the other.98 Moreover, even if the arguments in a brief are consistent with those
that a government would like to make in a given case, the government
may consider them to have adverse implications for future cases. In fact,
many developing countries, whose interests are more likely to clash with
those of amici curiae, are opposed to the acceptance and consideration of
unsolicited briefs.99
Finally, instituting the proposal in question may also damage the objective legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. Consideration of
amicus curiae briefs would allow a few select interest groups to influence
dispute settlement proceedings considerably and may call into question
the independence of the system. A small number of protectionist interest
groups often exert disproportionate pressure to restrict trade despite the
benefits of free trade for the rest of the world.100 In addition to protec-

is also suggestive that while international law recognizes the value of democracy, it generally does so at the national, not international, level. James Crawford, Democracy and
International Law, 64 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 113, 123–30 (1993).
97. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 222–29 (1944).
98. Thus far, most amicus curiae briefs have supported the position of the responding
party. Fukunaga, Participation, supra note 90, at 120.
99. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Dispute Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal Text, at 1, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/47 (Feb. 11, 2003); WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 23
October 2002, at 7–27, WT/DSB/M/134 (Jan. 29, 2003); Dispute Settlement Body Special Session, Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding
Negotiations, at 3, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/42 (Jan. 24, 2003); Dispute Settlement Body
Special Session—Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, at 3–4, WTO
Doc. TN/DS/W/18 (Oct. 7, 2002); WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting
Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 November 1998, WT/DSB/M/50 (Dec. 14,
1998).
100. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 68, at 515–16 (“[O]wners and workers in . . .
industries [that suffer because of free trade] will agitate for protectionist measures that
restrict imports. Such protectionist interest groups command disproportionate leverage in
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tionist groups, an empirical study shows that major businesses have been
active in submitting unsolicited amicus curiae briefs to the panels and
Appellate Body.101 One of the challenges for the multilateral trading
system has been to insulate trade policy from such protectionist pressure,102 and the acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae briefs
may conflict with this objective.
Additionally, it is unclear if the panels and the Appellate Body even
have the legal authority to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs. Although the Appellate Body has asserted its authority to do so, the text of
the DSU neither confirms nor denies this right.103
3. The Interpretative Approach to Reflect Nontrade Values
Reflecting nontrade values in the interpretation of the WTO Agreement has long been the subject of scholarly debate.104 This issue arises in
two different situations, when a nontrade value is embodied in non-WTO
international law rules, and when it is not. While in the former case the
issue concerns how these non-WTO rules relate to the rules of the WTO
Agreement, in the latter it is whether panels and the Appellate Body are
justified in reflecting the non-law, nontrade value in their interpretations
of the WTO Agreement. Critics claim that in both situations the interpretative approach incorporating nontrade values would reduce the trade
bias of the dispute settlement system and improve legitimacy as perceived by civil society.105 However, if taken too far, this approach could

domestic politics, and their lobbies are often able to secure import restrictions, even
though the overall citizenry suffers.”).
101. Fukunaga, Participation, supra note 90, at 120.
102. Robert Hudec, “Circumventing” Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 311, 312–17 (1993) (pointing out that direct
democratic participation led to the adoption of the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act).
103. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in
the United Kingdom, ¶¶ 39–42, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000); Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶
101–10, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US—Shrimp]; Brigitte Stern,
L’Intervention des tiers dans le contentieux de l’OMC [Third-Party Intervention in WTO
Disputes], 107 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.I.D.P.] 257,
289–93 (2003) (Fr.) (criticizing the interpretations of the Appellate Body). In practice,
the Appellate Body has not taken into account amicus curiae briefs unless the briefs were
attached to the parties’ submissions. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶¶ 75–77,
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. Howse, supra note 25, at 62.
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have harmful consequences on the balance of legitimacy. The following
discussion considers each situation separately.
(a) Nontrade Values Embodied in Rules of International Law
The interpretive approach incorporating nontrade international law
rules may be helpful in resolving trade disputes if the non-WTO rule
does not conflict with the WTO Agreement. For example, the WTO
Agreement may explicitly or implicitly106 recognize the relevance of a
non-WTO international law rule. In this case, the WTO members have
agreed that the panels and Appellate Body are required to rely on the
non-WTO rule in resolving the trade dispute. If the WTO Agreement
does not implicitly or explicitly recognize the non-WTO rule, the interpretive approach may still be helpful in resolving trade disputes. Even if
its relevance is not recognized in the text of the WTO Agreement, the
nontrade rule may help clarify the meaning of the rules of the WTO
Agreement. For example, in US—Shrimp, to clarify the meaning of Article XX of the GATT, the Appellate Body cited non-WTO international
law, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the doctrine of abus de droit.107
Referencing non-WTO rules may also generally improve the subjective
and objective legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. The interests
of civil society are more likely to be embodied in non-WTO rules, for
example, international human rights law,108 and governments expect the
panels and the Appellate Body to reflect other international agreements
in adjudicating disputes.109 In addition, recognizing non-WTO rules may
strengthen the objective legitimacy of the system. Article 31(c) of the
106. Article 3.2 of the DSU implicitly recognizes the rules of interpretations codified
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 10–12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for
Reformulating and Conventional Gasoline, at 15–16, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996)
[hereinafter US—Gasoline]. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights explicitly incorporates the provisions of international legal instruments
concerning the protection of intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶¶ 7.13–.15, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17,
2000).
107. US—Shrimp, supra note 103, ¶¶ 129–34, 158.
108. E.g., David Kinley, Human Rights Fundamentalisms, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 545,
571–72 (2007) (stating that international organizations, such as the WTO, the World
Bank, and the IMF, do not sufficiently address human rights concerns).
109. E.g., Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
¶ 8.162, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) (asserting compliance with an international agreement as Mexico’s defense to a U.S. claim in the DSB).
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Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) provides that “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”110 shall be taken into account in interpreting
international law rules.111 Similarly, the Appellate Body has stated that
the WTO Agreement “is not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law.”112 In fact, the panels and Appellate Body have been
referencing non-WTO international law rules in interpreting the WTO
Agreement when members have accepted these rules.113
Nonetheless, when there is a conflict between non-WTO international
law rules and the WTO Agreement, the application114 of the former may
110. It is unclear whether the term “parties” refers to the parties to a dispute or to the
parties to the treaty being interpreted. In the case of the latter, a non-WTO international
law rule cannot be taken into account under this provision unless the rule under consideration is applicable to all WTO members. One panel took this approach. Panel Report,
European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, ¶¶ 7.65–.71, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006)
(“[T]he rules of international law applicable in the relations between ‘the parties’ are the
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the States which have consented to be bound by the treaty which is being interpreted, and for which that treaty is in
force.”). On the other hand, the Appellate Body might have a slightly broader view as
long as environmental issues are concerned. US—Shrimp, supra note 103, ¶¶ 130–31
(referring to several international legal instruments on environmental issues in the light of
“the recent acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and recalling the
explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable development in the
preamble of the WTO Agreement”). See also U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, para. 472, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC,
Fragmentation] (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). While the report states that “it might
also be useful to take into account the extent to which that other treaty relied upon can be
said to have been ‘implicitly’ accepted or at least tolerated by” all the parties to the treaty
being interpreted, it proposes “permit[ting] reference to another treaty provided that the
parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty . . . .” Id.
111. The second sentence of Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WTO Agreement
shall be clarified “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” DSU, supra note 32, art. 3.2. The Appellate Body repeatedly found that such
customary rules are codified in the Vienna Convention, in particular Articles 31 and 32.
See supra note 123.
112. US—Gasoline, supra note 106.
113. For more detail, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 273 (2003). See also Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution,
40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 336–39, 362–64 (1999) (arguing that as far as environmental
issues are concerned, the WTO Agreement can be interpreted harmoniously with environmental rules).
114. In this Article, “reference” to a non-WTO rule means that the non-WTO rule is
consulted in the course of applying the WTO rules. On the other hand, “application” of a
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undermine the dispute settlement system’s overall legitimacy.115 Conflicts may arise in several different situations.116 For example, a direct
conflict may occur when a non-WTO rule requires the adoption of a specific measure that constitutes a violation of the WTO Agreement,117 or
when a violation of the WTO Agreement is justifiable under a non-WTO
rule. There may also be subtler conflicts between the WTO Agreement
and nontrade rules. For example, a matter deliberately left open in the
WTO Agreement may be articulated in non-WTO rules.118 When there is
a conflict between the international non-WTO rules and the WTO
Agreement, may the tribunals apply the former to modify or supersede
the latter? If so, will this enrich the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy? In the author’s view, both questions must be answered in the negative.
Regarding the first, the panels and the Appellate Body lack the legal
authority to apply non-WTO international law rules when they conflict
with the WTO Agreement. Although the DSU does not prohibit the ap-

non-WTO rule means that the non-WTO rule is directly relied upon in the absence of
relevant WTO rules. Although the distinction between the two is a matter of degree, reliance on a non-WTO rule that is in conflict with the WTO rules is plainly not a “reference,” but rather an “application.” PAUWELYN , supra note 113, at 273–74.
115. See Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317,
347–50 (2002).
116. For analysis on the notion of conflict, see PAUWELYN, supra note 113, at 161–200
(“Essentially, two norms are . . . in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to,
or may lead to, a breach of the other.”); Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making
Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 425–27 (1953) (“A conflict in the strict sense of
direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously
comply with its obligations under both treaties.”).
117. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Comm. on Trade and Environment, Subparagraph 31(i) of the Doha Declaration, TN/TE/W/20 (Feb. 10, 2003); World Trade Organization, Comm. on Trade and Environment, Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs): Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda, ¶ 31(i), TN/TE/W/1 (Mar. 21,
2002).
118. Conflicts of laws are not new phenomena in international law, which lacks centralized lawmaking authorities. Recently, however, there has been an increasing likelihood
of conflicts among international law rules partly due to the functionalist approach to international law. See, e.g., Douglas M. Johnston, Functionalism in the Theory of International Law, 26 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 29–59 (1988). Under this approach, international
law is functionally differentiated into several subareas such as trade, environment, and
human rights. Id. In these subareas, international law rules have been developed rather
autonomously through specialized institutions and tribunals. Id. As a result, international
law has become more fragmented, and conflicts among the rules are more likely to arise.
Id.
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plication of such rules,119 certain provisions of the DSU, such as Articles
7 and 11, suggest that the panels and Appellate Body should only apply
the rules of the WTO Agreement.120 Moreover, if the application of
non-WTO rules results in the modification of the WTO Agreement, this
violates Article 3(2) of the DSU, which stipulates that the dispute settlement system shall not “add to or diminish the rights and obligations”
under the WTO Agreement.121 In addition, nothing in the Vienna Convention justifies the panels and the Appellate Body modifying the WTO
Agreement by applying conflicting non-WTO international law rules.122
119. A non-WTO rule can be applied to fill the absence of the WTO rules when the
absence is not deliberate, and therefore, there is no conflict between the non-WTO rule
and the WTO rules. See PAUWELYN, supra note 113, at 213–15; David Palmeter & Petros
C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 298, 398–99
(1998); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for
Reform, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 653 (1998).
120. DSU, supra note 32, arts. 7, 11; Yūji Iwasawa, WTO hō to hi WTO hō no kōsaku
[The Interaction Between WTO Law and Non-WTO Law], 1254 JURISUTO 20, 21–22
(2003); Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties, 35 J. WORLD
TRADE 1081, 1102–05, 1116 (2001); Trachtman, supra note 113, at 342–43.
121. DSU, supra note 32, art. 3.2.
122. ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 110, at 248–56 (admitting that the Vienna Convention fails to provide complete rules to resolve conflicts among international law rules).
See also Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple
Modes of Thought, Keynote Speech at Harvard University (Mar. 5, 2005). For criticism
of the ILC report, see Benedetto Conforti, Unité et fragmentation du droit international:
“Glissez, mortels, n’appuyez pas!” 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 1 (2007). In this regard, at least one scholar suggests that, on the contrary, Articles 30(4)(A), 41, and 58 of the Vienna Convention require panels and the Appellate
Body to acknowledge that two or more WTO members may modify or suspend the WTO
rules as between the members by adopting environmental or human rights rules.
PAUWELYN, supra note 113, at 315–24.
However, this suggestion is not convincing for the following reasons. First, the
WTO rules, such as Articles XX and XXIV of the GATT and the last sentence of Article
3.2 of the DSU, appear to contract out of the conflict of laws rules of the Vienna Convention. GATT Agreement, supra note 56, arts. XX(d), XXIV(12); DSU, supra note 32, art.
3.2. Moreover, it is questionable that the Vienna Convention, which was drafted decades
ago, provides a suitable solution to the current fragmentation of international law. Second,
assuming that the Vienna Convention is applied in this context, Articles 41 and 58 of the
Vienna Convention merely allow “the parties to a multilateral treaty” to modify or suspend the treaty under certain conditions, but neither authorize nor oblige a treaty body to
modify or suspend the treaty, or to acknowledge the modification or the suspension
among parties. Vienna Convention, supra note 15, arts. 41, 58. Therefore, while Articles
41 and 58 might allow two or more WTO members to conclude an agreement to modify
or suspend the WTO Agreement as between themselves, these provisions do not justify
panels or the Appellate Body acknowledging and validating such modifications or suspensions of the WTO Agreement. See id. Third, the modification or the suspension of the
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Thus, the DSU requires that the panels and the Appellate Body resolve
disputes by exclusively applying the provisions of the WTO Agreement,
even if these rules conflict with non-WTO rules.123
Even if the panels and the Appellate Body had the legal authority under the DSU to apply conflicting non-WTO rules, which they arguably
do not, both substantive and institutional issues remain concerning how
to address conflicts among international law rules. The substantive concern is whether it is necessary to resolve conflicts between the WTO
Agreement and non-WTO international law rules. Conflicts among international law rules, often referred to as fragmentation, are a natural
consequence of how international law is developed. Specialized rules and
institutions have been created to respond to diverse needs and concerns

WTO Agreement is unlikely to meet the conditions set forth in Articles 41 and 58 of the
Vienna Convention, which establish that the modification or the suspension shall not
affect the right of other parties to the treaty and shall not contradict the object and purpose of the treaty. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 7.50, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997)
(observing that, per the DSU, parties need not have a “legal interest” to request a Panel,
rather it is only necessary for the complaint to assert a potential “infringement” on the
complaining party’s rights under the WTO Agreement by an ancillary agreement among
other members). See also, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 136, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997) (reinforcing the aforementioned view of the Panel and noting specifically the justification for the U.S. claim against the E.C. banana regime).
It should be recalled that the WTO Agreement reflects the balance of rights and
obligations of WTO members and that one of the primary goals of the dispute settlement
system is to preserve this balance. DSU, supra note 32, art. 3.2. The modification or the
suspension of the WTO rules between some members would inevitably distort the balance in the WTO Agreement and, consequently, affect the rights and obligations of other
WTO members. Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance Through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 383,
389–95 (2006) [hereinafter Fukunaga, Compliance].
123. One concern might be that the rulings of panels and the Appellate Body may be
incompatible with non-WTO rules or the rulings of other non-WTO tribunals. Thus, it is
suggested that panels and the Appellate Body should pronounce a non liquet and refrain
from making rulings when they face unresolvable conflicts of international law rules.
PAUWELYN, supra note 113, at 419–22. Nothing in the DSU, though, authorizes them to
abstain from exercising the established jurisdiction. Mexico—Soft Drinks, supra note 42,
¶ 49. On the contrary, the abstention of jurisdiction would diminish the right of members
under the DSU to bring disputes to the dispute settlement system. Id. ¶ 49 (A panel has
no discretion “to decline to exercise its jurisdiction even in a case that is properly before
it.”). The situation here is different from the one justifying the principle of judicial
economy in Mexico—Soft Drinks because the exercise of jurisdiction is not considered
necessary to resolve a dispute.
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across different areas of law.124 When efforts are made to maximize rationality, understandably, they result in conflicting rules.125 Resolving
conflicts would negate such efforts. Conflicts cannot be resolved without
developing a hegemonic hierarchy of different rationalities, which is incompatible with the relativity of most international law rules.126
There is also a fundamental institutional issue involved, that is, the capacity and eligibility of panels and the Appellate Body to apply conflicting non-WTO international law rules. First, panelists and Appellate Body
members may lack expertise in such rules. The application of conflicting
non-WTO rules raises the issue of power allocation within the WTO.
Political bodies composed of WTO member governments, not the dispute
settlement system, are better suited to make decisions regarding the
coordination of conflicts among WTO and non-WTO rules.127 Otherwise,
the power to make policy decisions which is reserved to governments
would be eroded, and the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system as
perceived by governments could be undermined.

124. Conforti, supra note 122, at 18; Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from
Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 859 (2004).
125. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999,
1006–07, 1017 (Michelle Everson trans., 2004).
126. Koskenniemi, supra note 122, at 12. Although resolving conflicts among different
international law rules may be problematic, the interaction between specialized institutions enriches the activities of these institutions. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note
125, at 1017–45. However, such interaction should not lead to the assimilation of
specialized institutions. In the context of the WTO, the integrity and security of the trading system should not be lost for the sake of the unity of international law. See generally
NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Jr. Bednarz & Dirk Baecker trans., 1995).
Moreover, even if panels and the Appellate Body resolve conflicts between the WTO
Agreement and non-WTO international law rules, they do not necessarily resolve the
fragmentation of international law in general. An international law rule may have different meanings depending on the context, and the application of an international law rule
by a trade tribunal may have only limited relevance in nontrade tribunals. See Prosecutor
v. Delalic, Case No. IT–96–21–A, Judgment, ¶¶ 21–24 (Feb. 20, 2001) (“Although the
Appeals Chamber will necessarily take into consideration other decisions of international
courts, it may, after careful consideration, come to a different conclusion.”). Some suggest that the International Court of Justice should coordinate the conflicting rules of international law. See, e.g., Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 862 (1995) (proposing that an international tribunal
with a narrow mandate should refer cases to the International Court of Justice upon encountering a difficult question related to public international law). However, this proposal
is unlikely to be realized. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened
by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 128–29 (1998).
127. Guzman, supra note 8, at 307.

2008]

CIVIL SOCIETY AND LEGITIMACY

111

Second, the application of conflicting non-WTO international law rules
may disrupt the balance between effectiveness and subjective legitimacy
on the part of governments.128 Using both trade and non-WTO rules to
resolve disputes enables panels to consider all legal aspects of a dispute
and resolve it effectively, which is the primary objective of the dispute
settlement system. Dispute resolution through such a comprehensive review prevents a losing party from seeking additional recourse in a tribunal outside the WTO dispute settlement system.129 However, the increased effectiveness of the dispute settlement system reduces governments’ control over disputes, and therefore undermines their perceptions
of the system’s legitimacy. In this regard, it is noteworthy that other international agreements often have individual compliance systems with
different degrees of effectiveness. For example, while the WTO created
the dispute settlement system specifically to enforce compliance with the
WTO Agreement, 130 international environmental and human rights
agreements prefer a different approach to compliance. These agreements
use a managerial approach that encourages and facilitates, rather than
enforces, compliance with their rules.131 When governments agree to
sign an environmental or human rights treaty, they expect that compliance with the agreement will be secured by relatively “soft” secondary

128. As discussed earlier, the negative consensus approach and other Uruguay Round
improvements changed the balance of the dispute settlement system’s sources of legitimacy. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
129. Assuming that panels and the Appellate Body apply only the WTO rules, res
judicata does not apply to other tribunals applying non-WTO rules to the same dispute.
Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil,
WT/DS241/R (May 19, 2003) (examining the complaining party’s claims, despite the
party’s preceding recourse to another tribunal, and reaching a different conclusion).
However, if the panels and the Appellate Body applied both the WTO rules and
non-WTO rules to a certain dispute between parties, the res judicata effects of their findings might prevent other tribunals from adjudicating the same dispute between the same
parties in accordance with the same non-WTO rules. See, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 245–47 (2003);
Yuka Fukunaga, Trade Remedies in East Asian Regional Trade Agreements, in THE
WTO TRADE REMEDY SYSTEM: EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 287, 304–07 (Mitsuo Matsushita, Dukgeun Ahn & Tain-Jy Chen eds., 2006); Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdictions in International Tribunals, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 191 (1999).
130. Fukunaga, Participation, supra note 90, at 384–85.
131. Fukunaga, Compliance, supra note 122, at 383, 385–88. See also ABRAM CHAYES
& ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). “Enforcement” of non-WTO rules not only means the
imposition of obligations or the finding of violations under these rules, but also includes
the exercise of the rights under the rules. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 32, arts. 1–3, 6.
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rules such as advising and monitoring.132 Similarly, governments decide
whether they will enter into an agreement based in part on the relative
hardness or softness of its approach to compliance.133 If the dispute settlement system applies its enforcement power to nontrade rules, governments may view this action as illegitimate, as they did not anticipate the
stronger enforcement of these rules. Although referencing and applying
non-WTO rules can have positive effects on civil society’s perceptions of
the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy, adopting such an approach is
likely to impair the overall legitimacy of the system if the panels and the
Appellate Body apply non-WTO rules that conflict with the WTO
Agreement.134
(b) Nontrade Values not Embodied in the Rules of International Law
Some argue that nontrade values not embodied in rules of international
law should be reflected in the trade tribunals’ interpretations of the WTO
Agreement.135 It is clear that the interpretation of the WTO Agreement
132. Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449, 451 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 421 (1983) (“There is now a trend towards the replacement
of the monolithically conceived normativity of the past by graduated normativity.”).
133. Kal Raustiala, Forms and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 581, 583–85, 608–09 (2005) (focusing on domestic politics and institutions, and analyzing why the review structure in trade agreements is strong whereas the review structure in environmental agreements is weak). But see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke
& Peter N. Barsoon, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 384–97 (1996) (arguing that deeper cooperation requires
stronger enforcement).
134. An exception to the above analysis may exist when preemptory rules of international law are involved. When a non-WTO rule has acquired preemptory status in international law, the panels and the Appellate Body may be required to modify the WTO
rules by applying the preemptory rule. Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization (2000),
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html. However, a question remains as to whether the panels and the Appellate Body are able and eligible to decide whether a certain rule has preemptory status. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The
Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 801–07 (1999) (arguing
that the International Court of Justice’s role is to recognize the existence of preemptory
rules, which are to be respected in every area of international law).
135. The international legal status of nontrade values often becomes an issue in international trade disputes. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 123–25,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7.86–.89,
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should reflect the object and purpose of the WTO, which includes addressing not only trade interests, but also nontrade interests and values
such as the preservation of the environment.136 However, the integration
of non-law, nontrade values into the dispute settlement system’s decisions could have detrimental effects on the system’s legitimacy if the
panels and the Appellate Body go beyond what is provided in the WTO
Agreement. First, such integration could create an imbalance among the
different sources of subjective legitimacy. Governments, businesses, and
citizens each perceive the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy differently and only share values to a limited extent.137 The sections of the
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sep. 29, 2006). See also U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Mainstreaming the Right to Development into International
Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade Organization, ¶¶ 46–49, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (June 9, 2004) (prepared by Robert Howse) (suggesting how the
right to development could affect the interpretation of the WTO Agreement); Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary
Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 330–38 (2002) (pointing out the ambiguity
of the precautionary principle in international law as well as in WTO law and jurisprudence); Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian
Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9, 11
(2007) (“What laws mean and the objectives they may appear to have depend on the
judgment of the law-applier.”); Andrew T.F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International
Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81, 106–09 (2006) (arguing that ideational factors
shape the character of the WTO trade regime); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking
at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247,
261 (2004) (The Appellate Body uses an “interpretative method that is inherently elastic.”). A number of authors believe that
international law is moving towards its ‘constitutionalization’—by which term
these observers denote a development turning the traditional, ‘horizontal,’ minimalist international law governing more or less exclusively relations among
sovereign states in strictly bilateral ways, into something more ‘vertical,’ as it
were—more densely institutionalized, more mature, community-oriented, value-laden, peremptory and hierarchical, according to some even quasi-federalist.
Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845, 845 (2004).
136. For example, the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement states that the parties to
the WTO Agreement recognize the importance of “allowing for the optimal use of the
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.” WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl.
137. For example, the attempt to incorporate labor issues into the WTO has met with
strong opposition from developing countries. See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and
Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 203, 210–13 (2007); Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs, The
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international community that are adversely affected by, or that disagree
with, the protection of a particular non-law, nontrade value would perceive the trade tribunal’s decision as illegitimate. Concerning the system’s
objective legitimacy, it is quite questionable whether the panels and the
Appellate Body have the ability to identify and prioritize the shared values of the international community.138 As a result, if the tribunals attempted to do so and assessed nontrade values not provided in the WTO
Agreement, their reasoning could lose persuasiveness and authority.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRITICS’ PROPOSALS
The dispute settlement system is not the only forum that can reflect
civil society’s interests and values vis-à-vis trade.139 In other fora, different balances of legitimacy sources are struck, and the perceptions of
civil society may be given higher importance. The dispute settlement
system’s weak subjective legitimacy on the part of civil society can, and
should, be supplemented in other venues—including the nonjudicial organs of the WTO, other international institutions, as well as regional,
national, and local bodies.140

Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries’ Perspectives, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 377, 380–84
(2000).
138. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 889–98
(2003); Nichols, Values, supra note 66, at 694–96.
139. The author has described the concept of dispute settlement processes as being
distinct from the dispute settlement system. Under this terminology, the dispute settlement system embodies a set of structures and procedures that are provided in the DSU
and institutionalized within the WTO, whereas the dispute settlement processes adopt a
more comprehensive view, covering both domestic and international processes to settle
trade disputes. Fukunaga, Participation, supra note 90, at 105–06. See also Yuka Fukunaga, Global Economic Institutions and the Autonomy of the Development Policy: A
Pluralist Approach (Dec. 14, 2007) (unpublished conference paper, on file with the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). See also Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws,
Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1112–17 (2005);
William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963,
977–78 (2004); Benedict Kingsbury, Editorial Comment, Confronting Difference: The
Puzzling Durability of Gentili’s Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative
Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 723 (1998); Koskenniemi, supra note 122; Krisch,
supra note 80, at 263–74; Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the
World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
140. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation,
Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 306–07, 337–48 (2006) (noting that optimal dispute settlement
requires multilevel procedures, including those at domestic and international levels). See
also Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263,
265–69 (2006) (discussing the new functions of localities in the global legal order).
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The legitimacy of the dispute settlement system should be augmented
either less directly or from outside the system. First, panels and the Appellate Body should endeavor to accommodate the diversity of citizens’
nontrade interests and values, instead of attempting to consider and reflect these interests directly within the dispute settlement system.141 This
accommodation does not imply that the panels and the Appellate Body
should refrain from making any violation findings or recommendations
in complete deference to the policies of WTO members. Instead, it implies that the panels and the Appellate Body should choose an appropriate standard of review depending on the nature of the disputes, in order
not to interfere with the autonomous preferences of citizens, businesses,
and member governments.142 In particular, they should apply a more
deferential standard of review in adjudicating disputes involving nontrade policies, namely, environmental, human rights, and health policies,
which are deliberatively left to the discretion of WTO members.143 In
addition, the procedures that ensure the implementation of DSB recommendations leave room for the responding party to defend the critical
interests and values of its constituents despite its obligation to comply
with the recommendations.144
141. Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 973,
987–89 (2005) (“The emerging legal order appears as a binary order, in which differences
coexist with a set of common principles. . . .”). See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY 265–71 (2000) (stating that international institutions should respect the
self-determination of citizens).
142. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 42–46, 68–70 (2003) (“[Subsidiarity] purports
to affirm a universal common good while still requiring ample room for pluralism in the
concrete determination and application of that good.”).
143. MATTHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 28–33
(2003) (“[T]he standards of review subtly balance the delicate conflict over legal and
political authority between panels and national authorities in trade and trade-related matters governed by the WTO agreements.”); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO
Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90
AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 194, 205–06, 211–13 (1996) (“The standard-of-review question”
implicates an “allocation of power between national governments and international institutions on matters of vital concern to many governments, as well as the domestic constituencies of some of those governments.”); David Winickoff et. al., Adjudicating the GM
Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81,
106–11 (2005). Further study, though, is necessary to reveal how the standards of review
should be chosen and applied in order to balance the need to enhance compliance with
the WTO Agreement and the need to accommodate the diverse interests and values of
civil society.
144. See Fukunaga, Compliance, supra note 122, at 399–426 (providing a detailed
analysis on mechanisms that ensure the implementation of DSB recommendations). Dispute settlement rulings do not have direct applicability in the domestic legal orders of
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Second, citizens should build a domestic partnership with their governments and thereby influence trade policy.145 For example, governments can be encouraged to hold public hearings146 or to take nontrade
concerns into account147 when crafting dispute settlement strategies.148
Conflicts of interests and values among citizens can be better coordinated
within the domestic sphere. And the full representation of citizens’ concerns in the domestic sphere would render redundant their direct reflection in the dispute settlement system.149
Finally, interaction between the WTO’s nonjudicial organs150 and other international institutions can address the dispute settlement system’s
lack of legitimacy as perceived by civil society. While the interaction of
the dispute settlement system with other international institutions may
raise questions of independency,151 the WTO’s nonjudicial organs are
major WTO members, and in this sense, members retain discretion regarding whether and
how to internalize the rulings. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust,
114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1215–16 (2005); Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,
The Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1
J. INT’L ECON. L. 83, 102–10 (1998); Krisch, supra note 80, at 259–60, 267–69; Joel P.
Trachtman, Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (1999).
145. See Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a
Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 235–36 (2006) (asserting that one
fundamental difference between the international community and national communities is
that in national communities “the foremost source of governmental legitimacy” is “the
people”). See also John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 792 (2003); Nichols, Standing, supra note 52, at
686.
146. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(b)(1)(A) (West 2008) (The
United States Trade Representative “shall provide an opportunity . . . for the presentation
of views by interested persons, including a public hearing if requested by any interested
person” before taking any action under Section 301.).
147. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 Dec. 1994, art. 8.1, 1994
O.J. (L 349) 71 (The European Commission may take action under the Trade Barriers
Regulation only if it is “in the interest of the Community.”).
148. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 61–70 (2003) (“[T]he WTO regime provides . . . a set
of procedural protections [in the domestic sphere] for foreigners when a state takes action
that affects their interests.”).
149. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
205, 217–18 (2000) (“Civil society’s ‘second bite at the apple’ raises profoundly troubling questions of democratic theory that its advocates have almost entirely elided.”).
150. The nonjudicial organs of the WTO include the political organs, such as the Ministerial Conference, the General Council, and other councils and committees, including
the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiary bodies, as well as the WTO Secretariat. See BROUDE, supra note 8, at 23–24.
151. See supra Part I.A. This does not deny the value of the interaction between the
dispute settlement system and other international institutions. In fact, panels occasionally
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not as constrained in this respect and may actively cooperate with other
international bodies.152 For example, the interaction between the WTO’s
negotiating bodies and international human rights institutions would allow the former to draft WTO rules that are more consistent with human
rights standards.
CONCLUSION
Today, a number of international institutions with narrow mandates are
inextricably intertwined with domestic legal orders. It is under these circumstances that citizens raise criticisms against the legitimacy of the
dispute settlement system and demand that it reflect their interests and
values. This Article has argued that fulfilling this demand may be problematic, as the perceptions of civil society are merely one of several
sources of the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy. There are necessary tradeoffs between sources of legitimacy, and these tradeoffs should
be carefully considered if the overall legitimacy of the system is not to be
compromised.

obtain information from other international institutions, and this is expected to add authority to their rulings. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶¶
2.16–.18, 7.234, WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005) (requesting the International Bureau of
the World Intellectual Property Organization to provide any factual information relevant
to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property); Panel Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶¶ 1.8, 7.138–.154, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004)
(requesting the International Monetary Fund to provide certain information pursuant to
the agreement between it and the WTO).
152. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24–28,
99–103, 137–41 (2007). The author does not exclude the possibility of interaction between the nonjudicial organs of the WTO and civil society. While the participation of
citizens in the formal political processes of the WTO could be harmful to the legitimacy
of the WTO, cooperation with civil society in informal settings might contribute to enhancing its legitimacy. In fact, the General Council has adopted guidelines for the participation of nongovernmental organizations in the WTO processes. World Trade Organization General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental
Organizations, WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996).

